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A RESPONSE TO THE COMMENTARIES 
Exploring the nature of academic understanding 
Noel Entwistle and Colin Smith     
University of Edinburgh  
	
Colin Smith, who has taken over from John Nisbet as co-author in this response, 
introduced the contrast between target and personal understanding in his PhD, which 
John Nisbet examined, and has continued to follow the topic with interest in his 
subsequent career as a schoolteacher and educational researcher. 
 
The lead paper looked forward to clarification of the nature of understanding coming 
from the commentators and accepted the need to be recursive in responding to other 
perspectives. We are grateful for the wealth of ideas contained in the comments and will 
do our best to consider them in relation to our own broadening conception of the topic. 
We have identified a number of themes that can be used to frame our response, although 
it was impossible to do justice to the whole range of suggestions we were given, while 
also taking account of Hume’s encouragement “to correct all that seeming disorder” in 
which the topic then, and still, lies.  
Understanding depends on existing conceptual frameworks and is recursive 
It was clear in preparing the lead paper that part of the problem in defining the nature of 
understanding is that theorists come to it with differing conceptual frameworks. This 
conclusion was strengthened by meeting yet other perspectives in the commentaries, and 
highlighted the first important aspect, missing in the lead paper. Peter Davies, looking 
from his own experience in researching economics teaching, stressed that the learner’s 
capacity to achieve an appropriate academic understanding of a topic “appears to be 
contingent on the conceptual structures they are able to bring into being”. And that 
explains why academic understanding within a university is necessarily recursive, as new 
concepts are introduced at successively more complex levels to produce sophisticated 
ways of dealing with topics and so extending existing conceptual frameworks.  
In their studies of economics education, Davies and Mangan (2008) have used the 
idea of ‘threshold concepts’ that form a ‘portal’ through which students have to pass to 
transform their understanding of the subject and so form part of the ‘target 
understanding’ that is set by academic staff. These threshold concepts are often ideas that 
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have, in the past, transformed researchers’ ways of thinking about the discipline and need 
to be grasped by students if their understanding is to develop smoothly. Davies and 
Mangan showed how students meet different kinds of thresholds. Basic concepts allow 
newcomers to the discipline to reinterpret everyday ways of thinking in more powerful 
ways, later on threshold concepts within the discipline show how groups of basic 
concepts can be integrated in meaningful ways, but the most complex threshold involves 
beginning to think like an economist, seeing how to engage with the discourse of the 
discipline and make use of the disciplinary models and theories to deal with new topics 
or problems. A crucial part of this final step is being able to enter the dialogue of the 
discipline and so communicate with experts and extend understandings further, in the 
ways described by Hazel Francis. And, as Peter makes clear in his comments, students 
have to be recursively reconstructing their academic understanding as they gain access to 
more sophisticated conceptual structures. This leads us to the related theme of discipline 
and culture. 
Understanding depends on the discipline and the culture  
The process of developing academic understanding involves adopting a deep approach to 
learning, with its underlying intention to develop personal understanding. But, as 
mentioned in the lead paper, the specific processes within this approach necessarily vary 
across disciplines, due to the very different forms of knowledge, and the contrasting 
individual styles adopted by students in seeking understanding. Pask (1976a) 
distinguished between holist and serialist learning styles, with versatile students being 
those who were able to move readily between these two styles to develop their personal 
understandings. Holists prefer to look, first, for an overall idea of the topic, coming to 
details and supportive evidence later, while serialists prefer to build up their 
understanding step-by-step, keeping close to the facts within a logical progression. Not 
surprisingly therefore, science students depend more on serialist strategies within a deep 
approach, while humanities students show more tendency to be holists (Entwistle & Tait, 
1995). 
In his commentary, Michael Prosser’s description of his own experience as a physics 
student suggest a serialist style, but also the reliance on learning facts and details that is 
essential to build up understanding in the sciences. And so, in his words, “the 
intertwining of memorisation and understanding is far more complex than is often 
envisaged”. But there is an ambiguity in the meaning of ‘memorisation’. It can refer 
simply to rote learning, which does play a part in coming to grips with technical terms or 
remembering details, or when the topic cannot be understood; but there is also the idea of 
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‘committing an understanding to memory’. In the interviews, students talked about 
rehearsing their understandings, sometimes by explaining it to an imaginary audience, 
and so strenthening confidence in their explanations. This process does involve 
strengthening the memory, but is far removed from rote learning, as we shall see later. 
Michael also points out that important contrasts exist between cultures in the role 
that memorisation plays in developing academic understanding. Among Chinese 
students, specifically, initial reliance on rote memorisation is common, perhaps 
stemming in part from the need to memorise pictograms when learning to read and write. 
When faced with formal examinations, Chinese students tend to adopt what has been 
called deep memorising; the intention to understand is counteracted by an equally strong 
need to bring details to mind readily (Biggs & Tang, 2011). However, this tension is not 
just an Asian phenomenon; it occurs wherever this form of assessment is dominant and 
students perceive the need for the accurate reproduction of received knowledge. So how 
could the form of memorization involved in developing understanding be modelled? 
Understanding involves a coherent web of interconnecting ideas and evidence 
Given the extensive treatment of knowledge objects in the lead paper, it is hardly 
surprising that several commentators discussed the role they might play in developing 
personal understanding. Formal examinations do, in general, tend to encourage surface 
approaches, but the final examinations that provided the focus for the interviews reported 
in the lead paper were clearly perceived by the interviewees as demanding understanding, 
and this was the context in which knowledge objects were more consistently identified. 
They were not memorised to facilitate reproduction but, rather, they were used as 
mnemonic devices to allow a personal understanding to be brought to mind and used 
flexibly to answer the specific question set. As Peter Davies said, “The idea of a 
‘knowledge object’ … is defined as a conceptual structure which the learner has 
developed, which they can visualise, which pulls in relevant information, and which is 
also dynamic. It becomes animated rather than being activated” (italics added).  
There is a sequence involved in the development and use of knowledge objects. 
They are created through an awareness of valid connections between ideas and their 
implications but, as one of the students said, “I think the facts are stored separately and 
the schematic, virtually a picture, is like an index”. The schematic within the knowledge 
object represents the interconnections, and the structure can be used flexibly to write 
essays or solve problems, and to pull in the related details, which may well have been 
learned by rote. That much is clear; but it is worth considering what is held in memory. 
The term ’knowledge object’ implies that there is an actual object in memory that can be 
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used, but the students’ descriptions of how it is used in writing essays or answering exam 
questions suggest that it is not an object as such, it is rather the logical steps within 
explanations that are remembered, and that the knowledge object is simply a mnemonic, 
held in visual memory, that brings to mind the steps in the argument. The link between 
visual memory and semantic memory has always been seen an important way of 
triggering knowledge from memory. 
Alan Bainbridge sees a knowledge object from a psychoanalytic perspective as “a 
relational process between an individual and an object, that could be another person or 
even subject knowledge”, although with academic understanding, the emphasis is more 
on knowledge representation than on people. However, the fact that it can be applied to 
both perhaps strengthens support for the concept. And, as the next section explains, 
understanding does also develop through relationships. 
Understanding develops through relationships with people and their ideas 
The development of understanding is dependent on relationships and the language 
through which ideas are communicated and discussed between people, as both Hazel 
Francis and Alan Bainbridge made clear. This was recognized by one of the interviewees 
in saying that she was “getting to know the people that explain the ideas or data”, she 
even referred to them as her friends.  For this reason, Hazel also stresses the importance 
in carrying out research into student learning, of “inviting students to report specific 
experiences in their academic context, whether this be a discipline, a course of study or, 
perhaps most usefully, a particular topic within one of these; always keeping in their 
reports the connection between understanding and the context of how and when it came 
about”. The interviews reported in the lead paper did, in fact, almost always contain 
discussions of specific essays or examinations, and the purpose was made clear, but the 
context did become lost in the subsequent attempt to see generalities, and even more so 
in selecting the indicative quotes for the lead paper. A case study approach would 
certainly be necessary to see understanding within the context of discipline and specific 
topic or task, and this approach has recently been used in two recent studies mentioned in 
the lead paper.  
These studies bring more directly into focus both the ways in which understandings 
develop through the ‘inter-animation of different voices’ (Hay 2010), heard as students 
listen to their lecturers and tutors, and as they read researchers’ articles. For many 
disciplines this seems to be the most important way in which the interconnections 
between ideas are realized and built into a personal academic understanding; it is the 
inner experience of ‘reading for a degree’.  
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Another way of seeing the processes that take place in reaching an understanding can 
be seen, as Hazel reminds us, in Gordon Pask’s work on conversation theory (Pask, 
1976b). He argued that understanding comes from conversations with tutors (real and 
imaginary) and with oneself, as the ramifications of the topic are explored internally 
through the ‘inter-animation of different voices’. 
The emergence of a personal understanding depends on feelings and emotions as 
well as knowledge. When tutors show interest and offer support, there can be a meeting 
of minds in which cognitive and affective elements are intertwined in the student’s 
experience (Karagiannopolou & Entwistle, under review). Conversely, when that support 
is not provided, students may retreat into surface strategies which, as Alan Bainbridge 
points out, may reflect the actions of unconscious defences in which knowledge is not 
personally engaged with or thought about, remains the ‘property of others’ and so is not 
fully understood. 
Alan Bainbridge also reminds us that a students’ feelings and attitudes to knowledge 
can be strongly influenced by their early experiences and their whole educational and 
personal history, and that “an understanding of understanding must consider the nature 
and role of … archives of past patterns of behaviour” and	that “learning is an existential 
and emotionally charged process”. These are important issues that often get ignored in 
writings on educational psychology. Hazel Francis points out that the empirical methods 
typically employed in psychology are not designed to investigate a concept such as 
understanding, suggesting that “the problems of understanding others’ understandings 
bedevil both conceptual and empirical analysis in psychology, yet understanding other 
understandings is central to learning from tutorial and text expositions and therefore to 
education”. Here, the students’ own purposes become important. 
Understanding can be open or closed, with important educational consequences 
The purposes that university students have in learning academic topics and theories are 
varied and sometimes, as we have seen, can lead to the tension created by opposites. For 
most students, the primary purpose is to fulfil course requirements and obtain a good 
degree, but many also want to understand the topics for themselves and expect what they 
have learned to be useful in a career and in everyday life. The lead paper suggested that 
students’ personal understandings varied in their breadth, depth, and structure, but recent 
research has indicated that they also differ in terms being either ‘open’ or ‘closed’. If the 
predominant motive is course completion, then surface approaches lead to a ‘closed’ 
form of understanding: there is no expectation that the understanding will extend, or be 
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used, after the university course is completed. But this is disastrous from the point of 
view of the academic who is trying to develop a way of thinking that will be indelible.  
If teachers focus their attention on students being able to reproduce their knowledge 
from effective knowledge representations, their understandings are more likely to remain 
closed. As we saw in the lead paper, David Perkins (1998) and his colleagues suggested 
that understanding should be seen as a process, which could be developed through 
understanding performances. If students are given a series of tasks that focus on a 
specific understanding, completing those tasks will bring to bear the intellectual skills 
necessary to reach that understanding. But that may still result in a ‘closed’ form of 
understanding, which David has since described this as the possession of knowledge, with 
information or other people’s ideas being passively accepted (Perkins, 2008). This has to 
be contrasted with performative understanding, which still requires the possession of 
knowledge, but also involves the development of personal understanding. Finally, he 
described a ‘forward-looking’, proactive understanding that depends on progressively 
enhancing understandings into more complete and useful forms, ready to be applied in 
new situations.  
In his commentary, David Perkins has introduced another set of categories to 
describe phases of understanding that map on to the three forms already described. 
Understanding can be seen, initially, as a topic to be understood, then as a tool to be used 
to explore other areas of knowledge or situations, and finally as a frame through which to 
view the world, which can also be seen as that ‘indelible way of thinking’ mentioned 
earlier. And this move towards ‘framing’ can be encouraged by making connections 
‘outside the box’, making sure that understandings are connected, where possible, to 
broader issues and real world problems.  
In all these analyses, David Perkins is looking at understanding specifically from an 
educational perspective, asking how can we help teachers to bring about academic 
understanding more effectively? We shall look at this aspect in our concluding section. 
Understanding is often described with the help of metaphors 
Each of our sections, so far, has been looking at a rather different aspect of understanding 
and we have seen how our commentators have been drawing on their own preferred 
theoretical perspectives, as well as personal experience, to consider the nature of 
academic understanding. In this section, we begin the process of bringing these ideas 
together by recognizing that attempts to describe understanding often seem to depend on 
the use of metaphors, which show this abstract concept in comparison to more concrete 
ones or everyday experience (Kövecses, 2010). So far, we have met, for example, webs, 
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tools, frames, archives, performances and conversations in order to understand 
understanding. The use of metaphors in this context is not surprising since metaphors 
underpin a good deal of our thinking and understanding, not just poetry and literature 
(Brown, 2003; Gibbs, Jr., 1994; Kövecses, 2010; Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 1999). 
All understanding, whether of the world or even ourselves, depends on choosing the right 
metaphor. The metaphor we choose governs what we see. Even in talking about 
understanding we cannot escape metaphors. 'Grasping' things, for example, won't get us 
as far as we would like, because the most important things in life refuse to be grasped in 
either sense. Like Tantalus' grapes they retreat from the reaching hand. (McGilchrist, 
2009, p. 179) 
However, McGilchrist points out that choosing the ‘right metaphor’ for describing 
understanding is not easy. 
[The fact] that knowledge comes from distinctions implies that we can come to an 
understanding of the nature of any one thing, whatever it might be, only by comparison 
with something else we already know, and by observing the similarities and differences. 
However, just as everything changes its nature, however slightly, when it changes it's 
context, what we choose to compare a thing with determines what aspects of it will stand 
forward and which will recede. … The model we choose to understand something 
determines what we find. If it is the case that our understanding is an effect of the 
metaphors we choose, it is also true that it is a cause: our understanding itself guides the 
choice of metaphors by which we understand it. The chosen metaphor is both cause and 
effect of the relationship. Thus how we think about our selves and our relationship to the 
world is already revealed in the metaphors we unconsciously choose to talk about it. 
Paradoxically we seem to be obliged to understand something - including ourselves - well 
enough to choose the appropriate model before we can understand it. Our first leap 
determines where we land. (p. 97) 
And in this open dialogue, we have a number of ‘first leaps’ - and possibly second, 
third and so on. As noted at the beginning of this response, people bring different 
conceptual frameworks to the topic of understanding and the above suggests that these 
depend, in part at least, on choices of metaphor. Building on this way of thinking about 
metaphors, and applying it to science, Brown (2003) notes how large complex, scientific 
problems, such as global warming, involve multiple metaphors working on differing 
levels. Indeed, abstract concepts that are central to our lives are often described using a 
range of, sometimes conflicting, metaphors. This apparent incompatibility between 
metaphors is, perhaps, even necessary to aid understanding of complex, abstract 
concepts. And this will surely apply to understanding.  
The lead paper and the responses are trying to work towards a coherent 
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understanding of something of which we ourselves have different experiences and which 
various forms of metaphor exemplify. Understanding, as we have seen, can be 
experienced as ‘closed’ or ‘open’. We may experience a moment when things become 
‘clear’ and, as we saw in the lead paper, “ ‘jigsaw pieces’ suddenly connect and you can 
see the whole picture”. Or, we experience ourselves ‘mastering’ certain key concepts and 
moving across a ‘threshold’ into a whole new world of academic discourse. We could go 
through other metaphors used in this dialogue, but the point is that we will need multiple 
metaphors to develop a convincing description of academic understanding and the 
experiences associated with it.  
The metaphors do, however, seem to form two broad groups. There are those that 
describe understanding as an event, a point in time when a particular outcome is 
achieved, associated with feelings about having done so. The associated emotions may be 
more or less intense, sometimes a ‘eureka experience’, often just satisfaction, but the 
focus is on the moment. The other group of metaphors implies that understanding is 
moving onwards, even though there are experiences of ‘provisional wholeness’ along the 
way. So, we master threshold concepts and pass through the threshold. We have an open 
understanding that leads us to further explore the topic. We have a tool (understanding) 
that we wield in certain performances to strengthen them, we then improve our dexterity 
in using the tool until it becomes something else – a frame for looking at certain aspects 
of the world in a more powerful way. 
This Open Dialogue, taken as a whole, leads us to think that it is not a matter of 
trying to pin down understanding into one main perspective, but of how best to utilize a 
range of metaphors. We might learn something from the experience of others when 
dealing with similar concepts related to education. One example is inquiry. In a European 
Union funded project aimed at helping teachers to support their students’ learning 
through more inquiry-based experiences, some contributors moved from asking what 
inquiry is to what inquiry might be (Hoveid & Gray, forthcoming). Perhaps we also have 
to ask, “What might academic understanding be for differing individuals in contrasting 
contexts and at different educational stages?” And how can we best take account of this 
complexity, both in seeking to describe academic understanding and in considering how 
best to support it through teaching and supportive learning environments? 
Supporting students in developing academic understandings 
There has been a great deal of discussion recently about how best to encourage and 
support students’ understanding, and the discussion of the nature and experiences of 
academic understanding can be used to look at this in a rather different way. In the lead 
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paper, we recognized that the wide range of differences in subject matter and learning 
contexts make any specific implications for teaching wholly implausible, but it is 
possible to encourage teachers to think about the link between teaching and learning in 
importantly different ways. There has been a view, particularly from Government, that 
being a good university teacher was just a matter of having advanced knowledge and 
acquiring a set of techniques that would allow that knowledge to be conveyed to 
students. Research into teaching and learning in higher education has, however, shown 
how inadequate that idea is (Entwistle, 2009; Biggs & Tang, 2011). Teaching depends 
not just on having knowledge, but also on understanding how students learn. A 
sophisticated conception of learning is necessary if knowledge and good teaching 
techniques are to be used in ways that enable high quality learning to take place. 
 
Figure 1    An expanding understanding of teaching and its main aspects 
(from Entwistle, 2009: 76) 
Figure 1 summarizes the findings of various studies to suggest how university 
teachers develop increasingly powerful conceptions of teaching and learning, and what is 
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necessary, in general terms, for an approach to teaching that supports conceptual change. 
It draws attention to three main aspects on which good teaching and learning depend: the 
subject matter, the teaching activities, and the relationships with students. And each of 
these, in turn, depends on both knowledge and feelings. Knowledge is important, but so 
are feelings and intuition. Good teaching, importantly, depends on an act of imagination, 
being able to imagine what it is like not to understand the topic, and what steps are 
necessary to help students to grasp it. So the nature of an understanding of teaching 
becomes similar to that of an academic understanding for the student. 
This dialogue has shown how our understanding of the nature of academic 
understanding depends on taking account of a range of overlapping perspectives, along 
with their multiple metaphors, that stress the intertwining of cognitive and affective 
aspects, and differing ways of using memory and learning strategies. The message for 
university teachers is that we must help students to become more aware of what is 
involved in acquiring a deep understanding of an academic discipline and to devise ways, 
appropriate to that discipline, which will promote and support the development of such 
understandings. In general terms, teachers can support students’ understanding by 
coming to understand for themselves what is involved in reaching an understanding of 
the discipline they are teaching, and introducing students to some of the ideas and 
metaphors about memory, learning, and understanding that come from recent research 
findings. 
What might that involve in practice? We want students to be able to recognize and 
understanding the basic concepts and how they interconnect, so explanations of those 
concepts have to be made clear, often by addressing them in different ways and on 
repeated occasions, particularly when they are threshold concepts.  
Concept maps can also have a key role. Just as students find ‘knowledge objects’ 
useful for remembering the main aspects of a topic and writing essays, so university 
teachers can use them to organize the teaching of a course or a topic. Creating a 
simplified concept map for a course can then be used as ‘throughline’ (Wiske, 1998) that 
provides a thread running through the course, allowing students to see how the topics 
inter-relate. Concept maps can also be used to plan individual lectures, thereby forming 
mnemonics for the lecturers, and also showing students how an expert envisages, and 
justifies, the inter-connections between concepts.  
Lectures can also be used to exemplify the discourse of the discipline, how evidence 
is used and conclusions reached, and to point up the connections to real-world 
applications or current issues that may help students to use their own understandings 
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more broadly. This emphasis on understanding must also be carried through into the 
assessment procedures, as these are important ‘drivers’ of the approaches to learning 
used, and influence where effort is most conscientiously applied. 
We also saw that academic understanding depends on conversations, with oneself 
and with others, and how a personal understanding can emerge from the inter-animation 
of the ideas met and through a ‘meeting of minds’ with supportive others, whether 
students or tutors. The role of tutors in encouraging students to seek an independent, 
critical understanding of topics cannot be overemphasized, as this also helps to build up 
self-confidence.  
Others will, of course, see additional or alternative implications in what we, and our 
discussants, have mentioned, and that is to be welcomed as we seek to expand our 
understandings of this complex and multifaceted topic. 
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